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Recent Supreme Court Decisions on
Arbitration: An Arbitrator's View*
SAUL WALLEN**

With an estimated ninty-five per cent of the 125,000 collective
agreements reported to be in force in this country containing clauses
calling for the arbitration of grievances, one is impelled to ask why
this method of settling disputes arising during a contract's term has
grown so tremendously in the last two decades.
For, after all, these grievances arise under contracts and involve their interpretation or application. And contract interpretation
is grist for the mill of the courts. Parties to collective bargaining
agreements were free to say to one another "We have made a contract. If one of us believes the other has broken it, he is free to
bring an action at law. The courts and the proper forum for a
determination of rights and obligations under contracts, including
those between management and labor." Yet American management
and labor have chosen not to do this. Why?
One part of the answer lies in those characteristics of a labor
agreement that set it off from the ordinary commercial contract.
A labor agreement, while assuredly a contract and enforceable at
* This paper was originally delivered at the Eleventh Annual LaborManagement Conference, West Virginia University, April 20, 1961. Footnotes added by the editor.
** Labor arbitrator and mediator, Boston, Mass. Privately engaged in
arbitration and mediation since 1946, Mr. Wallen is presently permanent
arbitrator for several major manufacturing enterprises. He was in 1954 the
president of the National Academy of Arbitrators.
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law, has certain unique characteristics. In the ordinary transaction
between buyer and seller the parties are free to disagree and make
a deal elsewhere. In the labor agreement the parties are under
heavy pressure to come to an agreement. They cannot go elsewhere.
They must in the end come to terms. The alternatives, the strike or
the lockout, may be too costly. Professor (now Solicitor General)
Cox states that this partially explains the gaps and deliberate ambiguities in collective bargaining agreements which create distinctive
problems of interpretation. We all know of cases where the parties,
faced with a deadline and stuck on a knotty problem, agree on the
wording of a clause each knowing that the other places a different
meaning on it. At the moment it is more important to secure a
strike-averting agreement than it is to secure a firm understanding
on the sticky point. That can come later, if they are lucky, by not
having to face the issue during the agreement's life; if they are not
so lucky, by a gamble on an arbitrator's ruling. It was a problem
such as this which once prompted Dean Harry Shulman, in a decision he rendered as umpire under the Ford Motor Company-UAW
contract, to write about as follows:
"Each side states that the other's negotiators knew the
true intent of the clause but that it assented to the language
employed to save the other side's face. The parties are not in
agreement on whose face is to be saved but they apparently do
agree that the umpire's face is expendable."
The second unique feature of collective bargaining agreements
is that the pressure to have some agreement rather than none, with
all that implies in terms of economic conflict, means that the decider
or the arbitrator can rarely say that the parties' minds did not meet
on the question put to him and that as a consequence there was no
contract. The parties have a continuing relationship which they
thought they stabilized. They do not relish having to do the job
again.
These characteristics of labor agreements that set them off
from commercial contracts account in part for the development of
arbitration as the chief means of settling disputes as to the meaning
and application of contracts between managements and unions.
The arbitration process, to the extent that it has developed a corps
of men familiar with industrial relations problems and with some
feel for the actual operating problems of a plant and a local union,
is more conducive to realistic interpretation of vague or ambiguous
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labor agreements than are the courts. This is not said in derogation
of the talents of judges; it is just that their experience has for the
most part been in a different sphere.
But there are a number of other reasons that account for
the development of arbitration under collective agreements. Parties
may choose arbitration to avoid the cumbersomeness and formality
of the law. They may choose it in order to have the dispute decided
promptly, finally and near its locus. They may wish to have it
decided by one familiar with industrial relations problems so that
the resolution of ambiguities in their contract can be realistically
related to actual conditions of the plant and of the local union.
They may wish to have a hand in the selection of the decider.
They may wish the dispute decided informally and quickly without
making a "federal case" of it with all that that implies in terms
of exacerbated feelings and diversion from the actual goal of production. They may recognize that the language of their contract, conceived in the crisis atmosphere of an imminent or actual strike,
expresses inelegantly or imperfectly their intent and they do not
conceive of the established judicial tribunals as having the orientation or interest necessary to properly establish their intent. Or, as
is sometimes the case, one party may accede to arbitration of grievances not because it is convinced of the efficacy of this method of
settling disputes at all, but because the alternative is a strike and
an agreement is not possible without yielding on this point.
To say the foregoing is not to say that the law and the courts
have no interest and carry on no activity in grievance and contract
administration. Prior to the passage of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, the laws of nearly half the states gave arbitration a statutory base which made promises to arbitrate enforceable
by the courts and placed the judicial system behind the enforcement
of compliance with awards.
But when one party goes to court to compel arbitration, the
other has the right to claim that the problem involved is not covered
by the promise to arbitrate. And when one party goes to court to
compel compliance with an award, the other may properly raise the
defense that the arbitrator has exceeded his powers. The arbitrator
can decide on the scope of his powers only if specifically authorized
by the parties to do so. If not so authorized, the courts have generally held that an agreement to arbitrate is based on contract and
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that it is for the court to decide whether the contract contains a
promise to arbitrate the dispute tendered.
With this thesis one could scarcely quarrel. Both management
and labor should be free, unless they plainly otherwise contract, to
have the existence of a contractual obligation to arbitrate passed
upon. If they did not in fact agree to arbitrate a particular kind
of dispute - i.e. one not involving the application or interpretation
of the agreement - they should not be compelled to submit to
that forum. And unless they had agreed in advance to have the
arbitrator decide the scope of his own powers the court remains
the proper forum for such determination.
One of the interesting but scarcely noted features of industrial
relations is that a number of the largest corporations and unions
have contracted to keep wholly away from the courts when it comes
to handling disputes arising under their labor agreements. Thus,
as an example, the contract between Ford Motor Company and
the UAW, and also the one between General Motors and the same
union, contain the following provisions:
"It shall be the function of the umpire, and he shall be
empowered . .

.

.to make a decision in cases of alleged vio-

lations of the terms of this Agreement ....of alleged improper
classification of employees, of alleged violations of negotiated
rates and upon the scope of his powers. (Emphasis added)
"There shall be no appeal from an umpire's decision. It
shall be final and binding on the union, its members the employee or employees involved and the Company. The Union
will discourage any attempts of its members and will not encourage or cooperate with any of its members in any appeal to
any court or labor board from a decision of the umpire."
Also contained in these agreements are specific limitations on
the powers of the umpire. He is denied power to add to or subtract
from, or modify any of the terms of the agreement. He may not
establish wage scales, rates on new jobs or change any wage except
as specifically empowered in the agreement. He has no power to
rule on cases arising under the articles dealing with either health
and safety or production standards. On the other hand, the nostrike clause is specifically not applicable to disputes over production standards, health and safety grievances or rates on new jobs
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and, after having followed certain specified procedures, employees
may legally strike over such matters during the life of the contract.
The Aluminum Company of America contracts contain similar
provisions.
The parties to these agreements-the giants of American industry and labor-have made their own delimitations between the
areas subject to arbitral review and the areas where they prefer to
rely solely on their own devices. Disputes over whether a subject
falls within either area or within one or the other of them they have
empowered their umpire to decide.
Provisions such as these, however, are the exception and not
the rule. Most agreements do not empower the arbitrator to rule
on his own jurisdiction. Nor do they pledge the parties not to
challenge his jurisdictional holdings in the courts. And most contain
an unconditional no-strike clause.
Despite that fact, however, the percentage of arbitration awards
challenged in the courts were relatively small, perhaps a few hundred
per year of the scores of thousands of issues submitted to arbitration.
But in a significant number of the cases litigated, the courts have
shown a propensity, under the guise of determining whether an
agreement to arbitrate the particular dispute had indeed been made,
to hold for arbitrability or (more often) for non-arbitrability because of the judge's views on the merits. Where this occurred, the
courts assumed the very function which the parties by contract had
agreed to have performed by an arbitrator.
With the passage of the Labor-Management Relations Act and
its interpretation by the Supreme Court in 1957 in Lincoln Mills,'
agreements to arbitrate were deemed enforceable under federal law.
Lincoln Mills charged the federal courts with the duty to develop
a body of labor law from federal labor policy and judge-made law
in the state courts. In three landmark decisions the Supreme Court
did just that in the matter of the enforceability of agreements to
arbitrate. These decisions not only limited the role of the courts in
passing on arbitrability but also set forth the court's views as to the
nature and character of collective agreements and the obligations
of arbitrators thereunder that have set the industrial relations fraternity a'buzzing.
I Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co. is the first of the
three. In this case the union brought a suit to compel the company
to arbitrate the grievance of one Sparks, filed when the company
refused to reinstate him following an industrial injury as a result
of which he had received a compensation rating of twenty-five per
cent permanent partial disability. The company pleaded to the
court that it was not obligated to arbitrate because 1) Sparks is
estopped from claiming reinstatement by virtue of his settlement of
the workmen's compensation claim on the basis of a permanent
partial disability, 2) Sparks is not physically able to do the work,
3) this type of dispute is not arbitrable under the agreement.

The agreement contained the standard form of arbitration clause
and the usual no-strike, no lockout clause. The lower court refused
to compel arbitration on the basis that the grievance is "A frivolous,
patently baseless one, not subject to arbitration under the collective
bargaining agreement." This conclusion was arrived at on the basis
of a review of the evidence as to Sparks' disability and an evaluation
of the employer's claim that no opening was available for one so
disabled.
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court and ordered
arbitration. This is a result with which one can scarcely disagree,
for it is obvious that the lower court's reasoning was not that it
was frivolous to claim that the agreement called for an arbitrator
to decide whether or not the claim for reinstatement lacked merit,
but that it was frivolous to press the claim itself. Hence the court,
not an arbitrator, decided the merits of the claim, contrary to longestablished principles obliging the courts to enforce agreements to
arbitrate and to refrain from themselves passing on the merits.
The second case involved United Steelworkers v. Warrior &
Gulf Nav. Co.' This company transports steel by barge. At its
terminal it performs maintenance and repair work on its barges,
those doing that work constituting the bargaining unit represented
by the Steelworkers. Between 1956 and 1958 the company laid
off employees, reducing the unit from forty-two to twenty-three men.
This reduction was due in part to the fact that the company contracted out the maintenance work previously done by its people to
neighboring contracting companies. These companies used Warrior
2
3

363 U.S. 564 (1960).
363 U.S. 574 (1960).
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and Gulf's supervisors to lay out the work and hired some of Warrior
and Gulf's laid off employees at reduced wages. In fact some of
those hired were assigned to work on Warrior and Gulf's barges.
The result was a grievance "protesting the Company's actions
of arbitrarily and unreasonably contracting out work . . . . that
previously has been performed by Company employees . . . .the
Company is in violation of the contract by inducing a partial lockout
of the number of employees who would otherwise be working were
it not for this unfair practice."
The contract had a no-strike, no lockout clause and a grievance
procedure reading in part as follows:
"Issues .. .which are strictly a function of management
shall not be subject to arbitration ...
"Should differences arise . .. as to the meaning and application of the provisions of this Agreement, or should any
local trouble of any kind arise.... the matter shall be handled
in a five-step grievance procedure the last step of which is
referral to an umpire whose decision is final."4
The company refused to arbitrate the grievance and the union
sued to compel it. The district court dismissed the suit "after
hearing evidence much of which went to the merits of the grievance."
That court said that the agreement did not "confide in an arbitrator
the right to review the defendant's business judgment in contracting
out work"; that "the contracting out of repair and maintenance work,
as well as construction work, is strictly a function of management not
limited in any respect by the labor agreement involved here." The
court of appeals affirmed by a divided vote, the majority holding
that the agreement had withdrawn from the grievance procedure
"matters which are strictly a function of management" and that
contracting out was embraced by this withdrawal.
The Supreme Court, holding that because federal policy is to
promote collective bargaining agreements and because a provision
for grievance arbitration in agreements is a major factor in achieving
industrial peace, any doubt about the scope of an arbitration clause
should be resolved in favor of coverage, said that:
"The grievance alleged that the contracting out was a violation of the collective bargaining agreement. There was there4 ld. at 576.
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fore a dispute as to the meaning and application of the provisions of this Agreement which the parties had agreed would
be determined by arbitration. '
Mr. Justice Whittaker in a strong dissent pointed out that the
employer had contracted out for nineteen years, and that the absence
of union demurrer was acquiescence in the principle that it was
"strictly a function of management." He also stressed that the union
had tried unsuccessfully to get a clause banning sub-contracting into
the agreement. He pointed to a line of judicial decisions which say
that arbitration will not be compelled by the courts unless the
writing manifests a clear intent to submit the particular class of
question. He found that in this case the parties' conduct over the
years was an acquiescence in the proposition that contracting out of
work was strictly a function of management and, by the terms of
the arbitration clause, not subject to arbitration.
Although this case is assuredly a closer one than American Mfg.,
I can find little to criticize in its result. The issue before the court
was, not did the subcontracting violate the agreement, but does the
agreement require arbitration of that question. These parties signed
a very broad arbitration clause. They agreed to arbitrate not only
differences "as to the meaning and application of the provisions of
this Agreement" but also "any local trouble of any kind." True,
they also said "matters which are strictly a function of management
shall not be subject to arbitration." To say that the question whether
a claim that the subcontracting here complained of violated the
agreement is not arbitrable, one would have to decide that it was
strictly a function of management.
But there is subcontracting and subcontracting. Some kinds of
subcontracting may well have been regarded over the years by these
parties as "strictly a function of management." If in the past the
company had subcontracted only its surplus work, or only work
requiring specialized skills its people didn't possess, or work requiring access to equipment the contractor had and the company did
not have, and if now it is contracting out the very work the bargaining
unit people used to do, at lower rates of pay while they are on layoff
in massive numbers, a viable question is created wherether the
agreement as a whole is not violated thereby. And where there is
an apparent conflict between the exercise by management of its
5 Id. at 585.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol63/iss4/2

8

Wallen: Recent Supreme Court Decisions on Arbitration: An Arbitrator's Vi

1961 ]

ARBITRATION

functions and the meaning and application of the agreement, an
arbitrable question surely exists.
For all agreements rest upon an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. Subcontracting in the ordinary course of business"make or buy" decisions based on considerations dealing with the
need for flexibility in business operations, or on the need for gaining
access to items or techniques not available in the plant or on the
need to meet time schedules and the like-may assuredly be a function or reserved right of management under a contract which does
not plainly bar it. But subcontracting undertaken to evade the very
wage standards the collective agreement was drawn to defend may
well raise a lively question about the integrity of that agreement.
Professor Archibald Cox has expressed this thought better than
I can:
"The notion that ordinary commercial contracts spell out
their obligations is a silly canard. Every contract, whether a
typical commercial contract or a labor agreement contains 'an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.' One who
sells a retail milk business impliedly promises that he will not
solicit former customers. A lease of coal lands in exchange
for a schedule of royalties implies an obligation to mine the
coal diligently. Under the Coca-Cola-type contract there should
be no hesitation in setting aside a discharge aimed at circumventing seniority or defeating a grievance even though the contract
says nothing about discharges because such a discharge destroys
the right of the employees to have the fruits of their bargain.
Upon this familiar principle of contracts one might fairly conclude in the absence of other evidence that the provisions of
a collective bargaining agreement establishing wages and labor
standards imply an obligation not to seek a substitute labor
supply at lower wages or inferior standards. The implied
promise would prohibit subcontracting for this purpose. But
there are limitations to the covenant of honesty and fair dealing.
A manufacturer who sells goods when the price is high is not
precluded from doubling his output because this would impair
the value of the buyer's purchase. A collective bargaining
agreement does not imply a promise that the employer will
not deprive the union and the employees of its benefits by
closing an obsolete plant or dropping an unprofitable line of
business. Similarly, the implied covenant of good faith and
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fair dealing can hardly be supposed to reach subcontracting
which is based upon business considerations other than the cost
of acquiring labor under the collective agreement. In such a
case either management is free to act or some limitation must
be found in the very nature of a collective bargaining agree6
ment."
I do not mean to infer that the union necessarily has a good
case on the merits in Warrior & Gulf. All subcontracting cases are
uphill fights for unions. Where the agreement does not limit contracting, the presumptions strongly favor management. I mean to
say only that it presents a legitimate question whether the particular
contracting was a substantial nullification of the agreement. That
kind of question is arbitrable.
The third case, United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp.,7 dealt with the enforcement of an award. An arbitrator reinstated with back pay certain employees discharged for participation in a walkout. After the walkout but before the award the contract expired and was not renewed. The back pay award did not
stop at the expiration date; it covered the period thereafter. The
company refused to comply, saying the arbitrator, by causing his
award to be effective for a period beyond the contract's expiration,
exceeded his powers.
The Court held that the arbitrator premised his award on his
construction of the contract and that it was not the Court's function
to interpret the contract differently. It ordered enforcement.
With this holding I find myself in sharp disagreement, as I
suspect most arbitrators are. Most of us have proceeded on the basis
that our powers are coextensive with the agreement and lapse therewith. In this case, once the agreement lapsed the reinstated men
were employees at will. Their right to back pay flowed from the
agreement and ended with it. In my opinion the Court had ample
grounds for saying that the arbitrator exceeded his authority in
causing back pay to run beyond the date rights continued to accrue
to the employee. I should add that I distinguish this case from one
where, for example, vacation pay is earned under an agreement but
does not fall due until after its expiration. In that case the arbitrator
6 See, Cox, Reflections upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REv. 1482,
1496 (1959).
7 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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would be called upon to rule on a claim for the enforcement of a
right accruing under the agreement though payable at a later date.
Thus we see that the results of the three Supreme Court decisions
are in themselves not startling. The American decision is in the
orthodox tradition. The Warrior & Gulf finding, while more controversial, has a broad body of opinion to back it. Only Enterprise
is not easy to digest. What is there about these cases then, that has
caused such a furor in legal and industrial relations circles, especially
among lawyers specializing in industrial relations law for management?
Two things. First, in its desire to limit judicial intervention in
arbitration, the Supreme Court has said that a claim is arbitrable
so long as it alleges a violation of some agreement provision. Thus
many functions of management believed by industry to be beyond
arbitral review may now be subjected to arbitral scrutiny for signs
of conflict with the agreement's provisions. This has caused deep
concern in the ranks of management although it is worthy of note
that the grants of industry had by contract long ago empowered their
arbitrators to rule on alleged violations of the agreement and to pass
on their own jurisdiction within plainly delimited areas.
Second, the decisions by their tone, may raise expectations that
arbitrators should or will broaden the scope of their powers beyond
the limits envisioned by the parties when they drew their agreement.
For the Court appears to have engaged in extravagant dicta
which make arbitrators look nine feet tall. Thus in the American
case the Court said:
"Arbitration is a stabilizing influence only as it serves
as a vehicle for handling every and all disputes that arise under
the agreement. ...

"The processing of even frivolous claims may have therapeudic values which those who are not a part of the plant
environment are not aware." (Emphasis added.)8
And in Warrior:
"Apart from matters that the parties specifically exclude,
all of the questions on which the parties disagree must therefore
come within the scope of the grievance and arbitration provisions of the collective agreement. ....
11363 U.S. at 567, 568.
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"The parties expect that his [the arbitrator's] judgment
of a particular grievance will reflect not only what the contract
says but, insofar as the collective bargaining agreement permits,
such factors as the effect on productivity of particular result,
its consequence to the morale of the shop, his judgment whether
tensions will be heightened or diminished." (Emphasis added.)9
This last quote, when literally applied by an arbitrator, nearly
always brings on him the wrath of one of the parties and often both.
It has been my experience that American labor relations have
achieved that state of maturity in which the parties want me or my
colleagues to decide only what the contract says, or to give them
a fair construction of what it says unclearly or implicitly. They
most emphatically do not seek my views on what will raise productivity. Nor do they ask me to make that decision which will be
best for morale. Whose morale? Some of our decisions cause worker
morale to soar, while acting as a terrific depressant on the morale of
managers, and vice-versa. Some of our decisions cause not only
tensions but hyper-tension in bargaining unit ranks while they at
the same time lower management's blood pressure to near-normal,
at least for a while.
The decisions have imputed to arbitration and to arbitrators
a mystique, a degree of divination bordering on the oracular and a
responsibility for shaping the parties' destinies that few arbitrators
relish and fewer possess or exercise. Their general tenor seems to
put arbitrators above the parties and above their contract.
Most of us conceive our role as confined within the four walls
of the contract. We strive to apply its terms where they are clear;
to interpret them when they are imperfectly expressed; to construe
them to cover cases falling in the gaps between the stated terms;
and to refuse to venture outside those walls which represent the
limits of our jurisdiction. Of course we consider past practice (the
Court calls it the common law of the shop). We form judgments as
to the parties' probable intent, where it is unclear, on the basis of
reason and logic in the light of the parties' joint objectives. We
sometimes look to practice in the industry or area. But we strive
to apply these concepts within the limits of the logic imposed by
that which the parties themselves negotiated.
9 363 U.S. at 581.
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The tone of the Court's decisions implies an opposite course
for arbitrators. The Court's philosophical approach appears to be
based on an extreme exposition of a philosophy which was useful
in an earlier day in certain specific types of industrial relations
situations but which is not generally in accord with today's labor
relations scene.
It is true that there is other language in the decisions which
conceive of the arbitrator as playing a more traditional and
conservative role in industrial relations. Thus in Enterprise the opinion states:
"Nevertheless an arbitrator is confined to interpretation
and application of the Agreement; he does not sit to dispense
his own brand of industrial justice. He may, of course, look
for guidance from many sources, yet his award is legitimate
only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. When the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse
enforcement of the ward.'""
But the above does not strike the dominant note in these cases.
What are the practical implications of the Supreme Court's decisions for collective bargaining? Those in management who panic
may rush in to insist on tightening the so-called standard arbitration
clauses to sharply delimit arbitration. They are bound to meet
with sharp resistance from union negotiators especially when they
get into the supremely sensitive areas such as subcontracting and
the like.
And if managements push for limitations on the scope of the
arbitration clause the unions will undoubtedly counter with proposals
for limitations on the no-strike clause. It might be said that this
would be a fair deal-restrict the scope of arbitration but preserve the
right to strike or lock out over those matters outside the scope of
arbitral review.
This formula is all right for the large companies and large
unions who meet more or less on equal terms and whose multi-plant
facilities permit them to weather these crises without crushing losses.
But what about the smaller single plant employer who just can't
afford a strike during the contract's life? Or what about the weak
10 363 U.S. at 597, 598.
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union unable to mount strikes between contract terminations? The
balance of forces between the giants encourages settlements without
arbitration and without strikes. The imbalance to be found in the
smaller enterprises may lead to more strikes than the parties or the
economy can afford.
It seems to me that strong campaigns undertaken to secure
drastic revisions of arbitration clauses would be ill-advised at this
time. I suspect that a rash of strikes over this issue is not likely.
It must be remembered that of the scores of thousands of grievances
arbitrated each year, only a few hundred ever get into courts. And
a fair number of these involve a few companies or unions who
never did have confidence in the arbitration process, in contrast to
the overwhelming majority of American companies and unions among
whom arbitration, at first tried with reluctance, has won an enduring place.
In my view, it would be well for contract negotiators to do
little for the time being about this subject; to let the dust settle.
I doubt that these decisions will prompt arbitrators to arrogate
to themselves powers they have not hitherto exercised. Nor do I
believe that the unions will urge them to do so. For the full implications of these decisions could be as restrictive of union prerogatives
as of management prerogatives. If I am wrong, and self-restraint
is not shown, there will be time to draw tighter arbitration clauses.
Observers may differ about the efficacy of the institution of
collective bargaining as a wage-setting device; as a distributor of
power; as an influence on prices and on the economic process. But
few disagree over the proposition that arbitration of disputes arising
under agreements has proved its worth in stabilizing shop relations,
in minimizing work stoppages and in imparting to worker and manager alike a new sense of dignity in their relationship. It is now
up to management and labor to distill from these Supreme Court
decisions those positive values which will serve to protect and
strengthen the arbitration process.
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